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Abstract: 
This paper is about two stories. The more reassuring one states that by establishing that a 
norm is valid because of its source, not its merit, legal positivism is, in its various forms, 
perhaps one of the greatest achievements in Western legal theory and practice. From 
constitutionalism to human rights policies, from criminal to international law and free trade 
agreements, from contracts to torts and e-commerce, legal validity, predictability, and 
coherence have found their most powerful ally in positivist thought. This contribution argues 
that it is time for a different, neorealist story: the metaphysical, ontological and biopolitical 
essence of its language demonstrates that legal positivism has in fact played a fundamental 
role in the substitution of action with behaviour, and consequently, in the        
normalisation of humankind’s self-annihilating animality as post-historical and post-political
‘form-of-(non-)living.’ 
Keywords: Legal positivism, legal language, liberal thought, reasons for action, Homo 
juridicus 
Something else is more weighty, 
and that is, whether there ever is such a thing as speaking about language1 
1 M. HEIDEGGER, ‘A Dialogue on Language’, in On The Way to Language, Peter D. Herts trans., London, 1982 
[1959], pp. 1–54, at 50. 
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To restore the thing itself to its place in language and, at the same time, 
to restore the difficulty of writing ... this is the task of the coming philosophy2 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Notably, legal positivism’s (LP) scope is to legitimise law’s authoritarian regulative instances 
by providing them with an institutional ground of reference. While it is beyond dispute that 
modernity has been LP’s golden age, current global and transnational processes of 
diversification or fragmentation – i.e., the pluralisation of regulative sources and norm-setting 
bodies at the macro, meso, and micro levels – appear to undermine LP’s assumptions, as well 
as threaten its capacity to achieve its aims. The failure to institutionalise (and, thus, posit) the 
rules that permeate global society’s workings as well as the spread of hybrid functional 
equivalents to law could be used to support this view. 
This paper aims instead to demonstrate that LP’s rationalism and the diffusionist regulatory 
landscape that characterises our liberal global age meet in a zone of interaction: namely, the 
behaviouralisation of human existence and relations. In particular, I submit that LP has 
normalised humankind’s behavioural ‘form-of-(non-)living’ as prompted by the theological 
and liberal traditions. In so doing, LP has played a fundamental role in the de-politicisation 
and de-juridification of the world. As this paper draws upon my recent critique of LP’s 
constructivist approach to normative phenomena3 and the liberal global-order project,4  both 
its premise and the unconventional negative terms that I will use in the following pages 
require some preliminary clarifications. 
When criticising the practical effect of the liberal conception of human existence and 
relations, I argued that Westerners currently ‘(non-)live’ in a sort of ‘global Eden’—that is, in 
the global aspatial ‘(non-)dimension’ in which what constitutes human uniqueness in 
Arendtian terms makes no appearance. This claim was also supported by offering a juridical 
contextualisation of Heidegger’s and Agamben’s scholarship on what differentiates human 
comportment from animal behaviour. The aim was to set out some of the juridical 
implications of our ‘form-of-(non-)life’. By this term, I refer to our alienated form of 
                                                          
2 G. AGAMBEN, ‘The Thing Itself’, in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, Daniel Heller-Roazen 
trans. and ed., Stanford, 1999 [1984], pp. 27–38, at 38. 
3 Author 
4 Author 
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existence in which we no longer act but merely behave according to liberalism’s reason-
oriented mechanisms of societal interaction. The movement towards this sort of Kojèvean 
post-historical (that is, animal) condition5  is in fact taking place through the formal de-
politicisation and de-juridification of the world—or in other words, through the substitution 
of government with the administrative and economics-oriented paradigm of liberal global 
governance. As a result, the jurist’s anthropological and socio-political function of 
interpreting normativistically our actions is no longer needed. 
On those occasions, I also showed that while, from a genealogical point of view, our shared 
behaviouralisation finds its origin in the extent to which the sterile technē oikonomikē has 
penetrated the domain of the political, the liberal roadmap of global standardisation extends 
this process beyond national boundaries through the alignment of particular forms of cultural 
sensibility to the Western (and in particular, Anglo-American) model of societal interaction 
and development. As a result, in this system of perfect contemplation of objective regularities 
rather than subjective irregularities, of language rather than languages, we do not have sense 
of our living experience because we do not come to birth, persist, die as ‘someone’—a 
consequence of the liberal aim to achieve perfect order and political freedom from the chaos 
that affects the condition of the state of nature (homo homini lupus).  
Finally, building on Arendt, MacPherson, and Agamben, I maintained that the same 
commentators who welcome the post-nationalisation of our societal relations fall short when 
it comes to recognising that the establishment of the modern state is, in fact, one of the 
West’s greatest artifices: the same (exceptional) sovereign contractual-constitutionalising 
process of pure, immediate, and simultaneous ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ that led to the 
essential positivistic formation of the modern form of polity, and whose mythical 
humanitarian façade was aimed at guaranteeing our existential political freedom through 
safety (homo homini deus), contained in itself the seed of the universalisation of man’s self-
annihilating animality. Consequently, and despite what is commonly taught by legal 
                                                          
5 A KOJÈVE, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Allan Bloom ed., James H Nichols Jr trans., New York, 1980 
[1979]. 
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pluralists, there is no need to ‘detach’ the law from the state,6 and the fall of the ‘bipolar 
system’ ought to be seen as the first neorealist achievement of the liberal totalising strategy.7 
What will be claimed in the following pages on the link between the behaviouralisation of 
humankind’s existence and the intrusion of the positivist tradition into the legal domain falls 
within this neorealist perspective of inquiry. According to the story that this paper aims to 
challenge, LP is, in its various forms (i.e., authoritarian, conventionalist, inclusive, exclusive, 
ideological, methodological, scientific, legislative, etc.), perhaps one of the greatest 
achievements of Western legal theory and practice. This is so because LP maintains that a 
norm is valid because of its source, not its merit.8 Thus, we are told, from constitutionalism to 
human rights policies, from criminal to international law and free-trade agreements, from 
contracts to torts and e-commerce, legal validity, predictability, and coherence have found 
their most powerful ally in positivist thought. Yet I argue that if we are to understand how 
LP’s word has ‘norm-alised’ our animal condition, we need to rediscover what constitutes 
human uniqueness and combine it with law’s anthropological special domain and 
sociopolitical regulative promises from a wholly new perspective. 
As scholarship on legal language and jurilinguistics is well-established,9 the analysis that this 
paper proposes might be deemed unnecessary. Yet what sets this account apart is that it aims 
                                                          
6 N. MACCORMICK, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth, Oxford, 
2008 [1999], p. v. As this paper contends, authority has disappeared long before the taking place of what 
conventional narratives describe as its post-national ‘fragmentation’.  
7 Author 
8 I borrow this definition from J. GARDNER’S Law as a Leap of Faith, Oxford, 2012, 19–53. 
9  For an introduction, and in addition to the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue 
internationale de Sémiotique juridique, see B. S. JACKSON, Semiotics and Legal Theory, London, 1985; P. 
GOODRICH, Reading the Law. An Introduction to Legal Methods and Techniques, Hoboken, 1986; ibid, 
Languages of Law. From Logics of memory to Nomadic Masks, London, 1990; C. DOUZINAS, R. WARRINGTON, 
and S. MCVEIGH, Postmodern Jurisprudence. The Law of the Text in the Texts of Law, London, 1993 [1991]; 
Brian Bix, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy, Oxford, 1993; J.P. GIBBONS (ed.), Language and the Law, 
London, 1994; A. MARMOR, ‘The Immorality of Textualism’, USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-5; 
ibid, ‘What Does the Law Say? Semantics and Pragmatics in Statutory Language’, USC Law Legal Studies 
Paper No. 07-9; ibid, ‘Can the Law Imply More than it Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, 
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 09-43; ibid, Social Conventions: From Language to Law, Princeton 2009; A. 
WAGNER, W. WERNER, and D. CAO (eds.), Interpretation, Law and the Construction of Meaning, New York, 
2007; C. HUTTON, Language, Meaning, and the Law, Edinburgh, 2009; G. L. McDowell, The Languages of Law 
and the Foundation of American Constitutionalism, Cambridge, 2010; P. M. Tiersma and L. M. SOLAN (eds.), 
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to show that the dissolution of the distinction between action and behaviour in favour of the 
latter would have not been possible without the artifice put forward by LP’s language. Instead 
of focusing, as legal positivists have done, on its ‘norm,’ the present contribution offers a 
neorealist10 contextualisation of LP’s enterprise by illustrating some of the consequences of 
the illusion perpetrated by the metaphysical and ontological essence of its ‘word’ and the 
pervasive structure with which it has been provided. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section II sets the level of argument by introducing the 
reader to the processes through which LP’s reason-oriented linguistic symbolism has 
normalised the substitution of action with behaviour. Attention is paid to how the positivist 
tradition has targeted the decisive anthropological and sociopolitical relationship between jus-
dicere and the individual’s active will. The discussion focuses on an analytico-linguistic 
study of qualitative data, and in particular on the textuality and legal phraseology of selected 
positivist scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic. Taking this one step farther, Section III 
addresses the relationship between the lexical artifice that LP perpetrated and the 
performative working logic of its dualistic apparatus of primary and secondary causes from 
the perspective of Agamben’s and Heidegger’s philosophy of language and political 
roadmap. In the same context, it is shown that if we live in the post-historical and post-
political age, it is because the substitution of action with behaviour has determined the 
absorption of authority by power. Concluding remarks will follow. 
 
2. Action or Behaviour? 
2.1. Setting the Level of Argument 
What this paper claims cannot be evaluated (and eventually criticised) if we do not first 
comprehend that homo juridicus does not necessarily behave, per se. 11  Homo juridicus 
behaves primarily when planning is of the essence, such as when more or less organisation is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law, Oxford 2012; J. BROEKMAN and L.C. BACKER, Lawyers Making 
Meaning: The Semiotics of Law, Dordrecht, 2003; J. HUSA, ‘Understanding Legal Languages: Linguistic 
Concerns of the Comparative Lawyer’, in J. BAAJI (ed.), The Role of Legal Translation in Legal Harmonization, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012, pp. 161–81; M. MAC ADOAH (ed.), Legal Lexicography. A Comparative 
Perspective, Aldershot, 2014. 
10 F. D’AGOSTINI, Realismo? Una Questione Non Controversa, Turin, 2014. 
11 Author 
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required for the realisation of crime or a tort, or for a purchase. Yet even in such cases, 
behaviour may turn out to be action in the very last frames of the agent’s conduct. What we 
can be sure about, however, is that there are cases in which homo juridicus simply acts, such 
as when the crime, tort, or purchase is the result of a self-affirming decision. Conversely, a 
person who merely behaves is, by stipulative definition, homo oeconomicus.12  This may 
sound strange, considering the number of studies and game theories posited in law and 
economics and the relevance these have gained in legal theory and practice. The point, 
however, is that man is the animal who reasons and speaks, or, as Heidegger would specify, 
says (to be intended as a relational unity of listening to, and speaking of, the thought-of-
Being13). Yet this merely defines human qua human;14 it does not define me, nor the reader of 
these words, nor anybody else. It only defines humankind as a species, thus helping the 
interpreter to differentiate it from its animal and vegetable counterparts. 15  Agamben 
understood this fully and, not coincidentally, placed this truth at the centre of the Messianic 
redemption he urged.16 
This is why, in one of his major critiques of liberal thought, Paul W. Kahn has contended that 
‘reason is not self-defining’.17 When we pursue our own interest, that is, when we let our 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 M. HEIDEGGER, ‘The Nature of Language’ and ‘The Way to Language’, in On the Way to Language, supra 
note 1, pp. 57–108 and pp. 111–36 respectively. See also ibid, ‘Letter on Humanism’, in Basic Writings, David 
Farrell Krell ed., London, 2008 [1947], pp. 217–65, at 220 and 265; ibid, Introduction to Metaphysics, Gregory 
Fried and Richard Polt trans. and eds., New Haven, 2014 [1953], p. 184 and p. 192; ibid, ‘The Thing’, in Poetry, 
Language, Thought, Albert Hofstadter trans., New York, 2013 [1954], pp. 163–84, at 182; ibid, ‘Language’ 
187–208, at 208; ibid, What is Called Thinking?, J. Glenn Grady trans., New York, 2013 [1954], p. 13; ibid, 
Identity and Difference, Joan Stambaugh trans., Chicago, 2002 [1957], p. 31; ibid, ‘The Word of Nietzsche: 
“God is Dead”’, in Question Concerning Technology, William Lovitt trans., London, 2013 [1952]) 57; ibid, The 
Principle of Reason (Reginald Lilly trans. Indianapolis, [1957] 1996; ibid, Parmenides (André Schuwer and 
Richard Rojcewicz trans., Indianapolis, 1998 [1982], p. 77, p. 104, p. 114, and pp. 148–63; ibid, Contributions 
to Philosophy (Of the Event), Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu trans., Indianapolis, 2012 [1989], p. 
5; ibid, The Event, Richard Rojcewicz trans., Indianapolis, 2013 [2009], p. 162. 
14 Hannah Arendt would instead speak of ‘Man’. See The Human Condition, Chicago Press, 1998 [1958], p. 8. 
15 Heidegger, of course, would not agree—which is why, as will emerge in the conclusive part, his insights may 
only partially serve the cause of this article.  
16 G. AGAMBEN, Profanations, Jeff Fort trans., Cambridge, MA, 2007 [2005], pp. 55–60. To be treated in 
Section III. 
17 P. W KAHN, Out of Eden. Adam and Eve and the Problem of Evil, Princeton, 2010 [2007], p. 175. See also 
Putting Liberalism in Its Place, Princeton, 2008 [2005]. 
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attitude be determined by the outcome of a rational calculation (Heidegger would call it the 
‘calculating self-adjustment of ratio’), we do not actively decide for and against something or 
someone but merely dwell in what we should perhaps define as a procedural—as opposed to 
absolute—truth. It is thus not a coincidence that, when dreaming of a perpetual peace, Kant 
turned the self-annihilating feature of reason into a universal law. This is why the Kantian 
notion of coercion18 does not require ‘the personality of those who are subject to it’.19 Thus, 
to claim that it is ‘normative reason ... that counts in favor of or justifies an action or an 
attitude (such as a belief, desire, or intention)’20 is pure neo-Kantianism.  
A human, however, defines him/herself as ‘that’—as opposed to ‘another’—person only 
when s/he lets the sovereign, self-affirming conflict between velle and nolle take place and 
then acts accordingly. The act of (per)forming our volitions is indeed what defines both the 
essence of willpower and our existential uniqueness and plurality in Arendtian terms. 
Consequently, to speak of ‘rational action’ is an oxymoron that reproduces the fallacy of 
metaphysical thought: action is as never rational, nor predictable, as behaviour is.21 To be 
self-defining, action must be groundless, boundless, and unpredictable. Every time we (try to) 
provide action with a reason, we are in fact transforming it into behaviour as the distinction 
between the two is not a quantitative but a qualitative one; that is, what matters is what lies 
behind the signification of our conduct, or, we might say, its anthropological 
andphilosophical negativity. What defines behaviour is therefore not the replication of our 
activities in a more-or-less systematic, coordinated, and consistent fashion (what Bergson 
would call ‘habit-memory’), but whether or not our conduct is grounded in reason and/or 
interest in the first place. 
The fact that, as will be discussed below when comparing Marmor’s suggestions to those of 
Varro, ordinary regularities do not require a rule should be analysed from this perspective. 
This explains why the anthropological and sociopolitical role of the jurist, among whom 
stands the judge, is that of ‘norm-alising’ our actions in so creating, protecting and promoting 
social order. This is how, through the jurist’s existentialist function, law performs its essential 
regulative instances and becomes the law. Many would deem this understanding of law’s 
                                                          
18 J. D. CAPUTO, On Religion, London, 2001, p. 49. 
19 See L. BERND, ‘Sympathy for the Devil(s)? Personality and Legal Coercion in Kant’s Doctrine of Law’ 
(2015) 6(1) Jurisprudence 25. Emphasis added. 
20 D. PLUNKETT, ‘A Positive Route to Explain How Facts Make Law’ (2012) 18(2) Legal Theory 139, 158. 
21  Author 
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functioning reductive. Among them would probably stand Leslie Green, as in his long 
opposition to conventional LP he has endeavoured to demonstrate that ‘law does much more 
than coordinate action’.22  This is indubitably true: as Green writes, ‘law should also do 
justice, provide goods and services, express sound values, and so on’.23 This view is shared 
by many conventionalists as well, Andrei Marmor among them.24 What should be noted, 
however, is that none of this—nor any authoritarian and regulative claims that the law might 
possibly have—would be successful without the interference of the jurist over the (actively 
decisive) unpredictability of what makes us human. For this to happen, the jurist needs first to 
interpret normativistically the individual’s active will and then, through the formulation of 
(and answer to) a quaestio juris, hold ‘that’ individual accountable for the consequences of 
her/his sovereign choice25—the only exception to this process being, not coincidentally, when 
the individual’s conduct assumes the features of a (negligent, unintentional, etc.) behavioural 
outcome such as when in Criminal law the mens rea is displaced from view. In contrast to 
this, the mechanical rationalisation of human conduct prompted by liberal thought has 
nullified action’s essence in favour of behaviour in thus draining humans’ existentialist self-
definition and leading to what Agamben has defined as the ‘animality of man in post-
history’.26  
 
2.2. The Linguistic Artifice 
This paper’s main claim is that LP’s rationalism has normalised our behaviouralisation by 
offering it an institutional basis of legitimation. More precisely, legal positivists have done so 
by transplanting into the legal dimension the following things: 1) the liberal conception 
which, notwithstanding liberalism’s humanitarian façade, understands man as a behavioural 
(and replaceable) contracting unit, and 2) the ‘authority-power’ dichotomy which informs the 
metaphysical and ontological structure of the Western politico-theological tradition. The 
                                                          
22 L. GREEN, ‘Positivism and Conventionalism’ (1999) 12(1) Can. J. L. Jur. 35, 42. See also Gardner, supra note 
8, pp. 205–18, 272; K. BROWNLEE, ‘On Gardner on Law in General’ (2015) 6(3) Jurisprudence 567. 
23 Ibid, p. 52. 
24 In Marmor’s words, ‘[i]t is just puzzling, however, and simply groundless, to maintain that coordination is all 
that the law does’, in Positive Law and Objective Values, Oxford, 2001, p. 48. See also below note 43. 
25 Author 
26 G. AGAMBEN, The Open. Man and Animal, Kevin Attell trans., Stanford, 2004 [2002], p. 12. 
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following reflections deal with the first component of my claim. I shall discuss the second 
one in Section III. 
Hart criticised ‘the simple model of law as the sovereign’s coercive orders’ for its descriptive 
deficiencies as, in his words, it did not ‘fit the facts’.27 Yet for our purposes, the same may be 
said about LP, broadly understood. Countless examples may be quoted to support this view. 
A good start would be to reflect on why Agamben is of the opinion that Kant’s 
aforementioned ontological illusion found its greatest expression in Kelsen’s pure theory of 
(public) law and notion of sovereignty—that is, in the positivistic conception that sees ‘[t]he 
relationship between norm and behaviour ... not [as] a relation of being but a relation of 
having-to-be’28). The term ‘behaviour’, I contend, is obviously not casual, because what takes 
place with Kelsen’s normalisation of the Kantian categorical paradigm of operativity and 
command is the voiding of the subject’s free action as informed by the internal conflict from 
which the intentional choice between velle and nolle arises. What is neglected is thus the 
sovereignty of the will to perform the self-determination and comprehension of humans’ 
uniqueness through the affirmation or negation of a future project.29  
Analogous remarks may be made in relation to other accounts as well. In condemning 
Stephen Perry’s analysis of Hart’s internal perspective, Kramer argued that Hart did not 
                                                          
27 HLA HART, The Concept of Law, Oxford, 2012 [1964], p. 79 and p. 80. 
28  G. AGAMBEN, Opus Dei. An Archaeology of Duty, Adam Kotso trans., Stanford, 2013 [2012], p. 124. 
Agamben further clarifies that even though Kant 
 
believed himself to have secured . . . the possibility of metaphysics and to have 
founded, at the same time, an ethics that was neither juridical nor religious[, his] 
ontology is in truth an ontology of command [in which] the guarantee of the 
effectiveness of duty is . . . the law.  
 
See also ibid, p. 122, p. 123, and p. 112; Agamben, supra note 26, pp. 49–92, and below note 95; Hans Kelsen, 
General Theory of Law and State, Clarke, 1945, p. 3, according to whom ‘[l]aw is an order of human 
behaviour’. Similarly, to Hannah Arendt, Kant’s categorical imperative is apolitical because it is aimed at 
‘persuad[ing] the will to accept the dictate of reason [by bringing] back the concept of obedience, through a 
back door as it were’. In ‘Some Questions of Moral Philosophy’, in Responsibility and Judgement, Jerome Kohn 
ed., New York, [1968] 2003, pp. 49–146, at 72. See also ibid, The Life of the Mind Vol. II, New York, 1978 
[1971], p. 63. 
29  As will emerge in due course, I am using the term ‘project’ neither as a synonymous with ‘plan’ nor 
‘program’. See below note 60. On why Kant’s moral philosophy is logical, see below note 91.  
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‘plac[e] vagrant dogs and Holmesian bad men in the same category as committed officials’.30 
It may be doubted whether Agamben, or other philosophers and political theorists who have 
inquired into our animalisation and argued for a post-human ethics, such as Bunch,31 would 
agree. Hart’s is indeed a reductive practice theory, that is a positivist view that distinguishes 
between habits and social rules32 by reference to the (ontological, as Agamben would label it) 
internal aspect of compliance. In particular, Hart’s aim is to explain that law and legal 
phenomena depend on our acceptance of behavioural patterns as binding ‘general standards 
to be followed by the group as a whole’.33 The merits and limits of Hart’s conception are 
well-known and have been discussed at length over more than five decades. For our purposes 
here, what should be noted is that Hart’s focus on the (rule-guided) regularities in the 
behaviour of a given group displaces the anthropological and philosophical essence of what 
makes us human—a consequence that may shed new light on the influence of the school of 
linguistic philosophy on Hart’s reasoning.34 In other words, while Hart’s intention was to 
abandon Kensen’s behavioural neo-Kantianism, his substitution of the grundnorm with the 
rule of recognition leads to the same self-annihilating outcome. 
In addition, one could point out how the terms ‘action’ and ‘behaviour’ are constantly (and 
too easily) interchanged in Andrei Marmor’s reflections on the values and limits of 
coordination and constitutive conventions.35 The same applies to his monograph on social 
                                                          
30 M. H. KRAMER, In Defense of Legal Positivism. Law Without Trimmings, Oxford, 2007 [1999], p. 242. 
31 M. BUNCH, ‘Posthuman Ethics and the Becoming Animal of Emmanuel Levinas’ (2014) 55(1) Culture, 
Theory and Critique 34. 
32 Hart, supra note 27, pp. 55–61, 85–91, and 254–59. For a classic critique of Hartian reductionism, see R. 
SUMMERS, ‘Professor HLA Hart’s Concept of Law’ (1963) Duke Law Journal 629–70. As Summers, Dworkin, 
and others have made it clear, Hart’s dichotomy is problematic for a series of reasons. Unfortunately, a detailed 
analysis of Hart’s understanding of the similarities and differences between habits and social rules would fall 
outside the purview of this contribution. It would however prove worthwhile to address it through the lens of 
Rodolfo Sacco’s anthropological account in Antropologia Giuridica, Bologne, 2007. For a classic critique of 
Hart’s reductionism, see Robert Summers, ‘Professor HLA Hart’s Concept of Law’ (1963) Duke Law Journal 
629–70. 
33 Hart, supra note 27, p. 56. 
34 R. H. S. TUR, ‘Variety or Uniformity?’, in L. DUARTE D’ALMEIDA, J. EDWARDS, and A. DOLCETTI (eds.), 
Reading HLA’s ‘The Concept of Law’, Oxford, 2013, pp. 71–112, at 71–75; L. GREEN, ‘The Concept of Law 
Revisited’ (1996) 94 Michigan L Rev 1687. See also Section III. 
35 Marmor, supra note 24, pp. 25–48. 
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conventions.36  Importantly, Marmor seems to pay little attention to this antithesis in his 
Philosophy of Law, such as when he appears to underestimate the essence of what constitutes 
behaviour. By way of an example, Marmor writes that ‘[l]aw’s essential character is 
prescriptive: It purports to guide action, alter modes of behavior, constrain the practical 
deliberation of its subjects; generally speaking, the law purports to give us reasons for 
action’.37 That action does not, by definition, need a reason will be discussed below; what 
should be noted here is that Marmor’s inaccuracy in the combination of action with behaviour 
is not without consequences. Indeed, when contending that ‘[c]onventions ... are social rules’, 
Marmor specifies that ‘[r]ules should be distinguished from both regularities of behaviour 
and generally recognized reasons’.38 Arguably, no one would dispute this categorisation, as 
Marmor is right in saying that ‘[n]ot everything we do regularly we do as an instance of 
following a rule’.39 The example of eating breakfast that Marmor puts forward to support his 
point is certainly convincing. The difficulty, however, emerges when we try to overlap these 
words with what Marmor argued in another work of his—that ‘practices are rule-governed 
activities’40 and that ‘[w]e have a social practice when a certain type of human activity is 
either constituted or at least largely governed by rules or conventions’.41 Should we give 
priority to the latter set of statements, we would wonder not only whether the regular 
practice of eating at breakfast is, in fact, rule-governed, but also whether eating at breakfast is 
a (rule-independent?) behavioural input or a (rule-governed?) activity in the first place. 
Yet it could be conceded that Marmor’s approach to why constitutive conventions are both 
behaviour-/action- informed and guiding is comprehensible in terms of the roadmap that he 
wishes to pursue. As Hart had remained ‘silent on the question of what makes it rational or 
                                                          
36 Marmor, supra note 9, chs 1, 2, and 6. 
37 A. MARMOR, Philosophy of Law, Princeton, 2011, at 1. Emphases added. 
38 Marmor, supra note 9, p. 13. 
39 Ibid. The same point was made by Varro, whose account is not coincidentally used by Agamben in his inquiry 
into the non-juridical essence of regularities ‘which [are] present in ordinary usage’. See Giorgio Agamben, The 
Highest Poverty. Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, Adam Kotzo trans., Stanford, 2013 [2011], p. 66. See also 
Agamben’s discussion of ‘the Franciscans’ arguments against John XXII’, aimed at proving that ‘drinking and 
eating [are] paradigms of purely factual human practice lacking any juridical implication’, ibid, 126, and 129–
31. 
40 Andrei Marmor, ‘An Institutional Conception of Authority’, USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-10 
11. Emphasis added. 
41 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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intelligible for people to regard the relevant social norms as binding or obligatory’, 42 
Marmor’s intention is in fact to fill this void by stressing the ‘need [for] a theory of social 
convention to articulate the requisite foundations’.43 However, what is of relevance for us is 
that Marmor’s conception inevitably leads to a form of ‘non-normative’44 LP that is merely 
descriptive and amoral in its essence.45 This is simply inevitable: neither the behavioural 
mechanisation of human conduct and relations, nor the legal institutionalisation of the 
(authoritarian) processes that regulate them, is compatible with moral claims, the 
signification of which depends on our self-defining decisive thrownness into a                      
‘(form-of-)ethics’.46 
                                                          
42 Marmor, supra note 37, p. 57. 
43 Ibid, 60. Marmor’s argument in favour of constitutive conventions, as opposed to coordination conventions, 
ought to be appreciated along this line of reasoning. See also supra note 24. 
44 Marmor, supra note 37, pp. 109–15. 
45 A. MARMOR ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral’, USC Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 05–16. Marmor’s is a declared attempt to defend Hartian LP. It would prove worthwhile to compare it to the 
view Leslie Green has set out in ‘Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals’ (2008) 83 New York 
Univ. LR 1035, as Marmor’s account is not discussed in it. See also Michael E Wilkinson, ‘Is Law Morally 
Risky? Alienation, Acceptance, and Hart’s Concept of Law’ (2010) 30(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 441. 
46 The necessity to speak of an ethics whose substance is inextricably united with its own form emerges when 
we compare Agamben’s notion of ethics with Marmor’s inquiry into ethical positivism. According to Agamben, 
 
[t]he fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is 
that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny, 
that humans must enact. This is the only reason why something like an ethics can 
exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this or that substance, this 
or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible—there would be only tasks 
to be done. 
 
G. AGAMBEN, The Coming Community, Micheal Hardt trans. Minneapolis, 2013 [1990], p. 42. See also ibid, 
Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, Karen E Pinkus and Michael Hardt trans., Minneapolis, 
1991[1982], p. 108. This notion of ethics overlaps with the role that Agamben assigns to pure mannerism in the 
community he urges us to form. G. AGAMBEN, The Use of Bodies, Adam Kotso trans. Stanford, [2014] 2016, pp.  
207–13. See also below note 109. 
Clearly Agamben re-proposes Heidegger’s vision, according to which when ethics becomes conceptual, it 
ceases to be ethics and turns into ontology. See Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, supra note 13, p. 258. If a 
merely existentialist ethics is the only ethics possible, both the second component of Tom Campbell’s notion of 
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I will come back to this in Section III when inquiring into Bertea’s non-positivist 
moralisation of law’s normative claim. For now, what should be noted is that all legal 
rationalists use the terms ‘action’ and ‘behaviour’ loosely. Joseph Raz, for instance, famously 
contended ‘the law claims that the existence of legal rules is a reason for conforming 
behaviour’.47 Yet a little later, when asking whether this meant that ‘the law requires action 
against reason’,48 he answered ‘No, it merely means that the law holds itself, i.e. the existence 
of the relevant legal rule, to be a reason which tips the balance and provides a sufficient 
reason for the required act’. 49 Similarly, Coleman is of the opinion that  
[a]bove all else, law is a regulative institution that governs or purports 
to govern our behavior by telling us what we are prohibited from 
doing and what we are permitted to do; what we can require of others 
and what others can demand of us. Law purports not only to govern 
aspects of our conduct, but to do so in a distinctive fashion.50 
Yet Coleman tells us that ‘one of the most important distinctions’ in his book is ‘the 
distinction (for each agent A) between (1) something’s being a reason for A to act; and (2) 
something’s being a reason on which A acts’. Once we acknowledge this antithesis, it 
becomes easier to understand that ‘the distinctive feature of law’s governance ... is that it 
purports to govern by creating reasons for action’.51  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ethical positivism on the duty (or, we may say, task) of judges and the analysis that Marmor offers of it ought to 
be wholly reconsidered. See Marmor, supra note 37, pp. 113–15. 
47 J. RAZ, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford 1979, p. 30. Emphasis added. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. Emphases added. 
50 J. L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, Oxford, 
2010 [2001], p. 70. 
51 Ibid, p. 71. See also ibid, ‘Law’ (2003) 9(1) Legal Theory 14, 41; ibid, ‘Truth and Objectivity in Law’ (1995) 
1(1) Legal Theory 33, where Coleman contends that ‘[legal sentences] endorse or prescribe actions’, at 34. 
Finally, it should be noted that Coleman has more recently abandoned the term ‘action’, and argued that the 
‘[l]aw claims to create reasons for acting’. For our scope, it would prove worthwhile to analyse this last account 
through the lens of Hamlet’s distinction between ‘action’ and ‘acting’ and the role that, according to Carl 
Schmitt, this dichotomy played in the formation of modernity. See Jules L Coleman, ‘The Architecture of 
Jurisprudence’ (2011) 121(1) Yale Law Journal 2, 78, emphasis added; Carl Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The 
Intrusion of the Time into the Play, David Pan and Jennifer R Rust trans., Candor, 2009 [1956]. 
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Attention should also be paid to the works of Scott J Shapiro, and in particular, to his reason-
oriented theory of plans. In trying to overcome the limits of David Lewis’s work on 
coordination conventions, 52  and from Michael E Bratman’s psychological account of 
intention(s) and action(s),53 Shapiro’s aim was to explain how and why ‘the law organizes 
individual and collective behaviour so that members of a community can bring about moral 
goods that could not have been achieved, or achieved as well, otherwise’.54 The law does so, 
Shapiro explains, because ‘legal activity is a form of social planning’ and ‘planning is an 
excellent, often indispensable, method for guiding, coordinating, and monitoring behaviour in 
social settings’. 55  Yet a few pages before, Shapiro had contended that plans are norms 
because ‘they are guides for conduct, insofar as their function is to pick out courses of action 
that are required, permitted, or authorised under certain circumstances’.56 Along the same line 
of reasoning, Shapiro then distinguishes between plans that regulate actions (he calls them 
‘authorizations, instructions, stipulations, and factorizations’) and plans that regulate planning 
(such as a ‘bartender directive’ or ‘smoking permissions’).57  
As a result, the anthropological and philosophical antithesis between action and behaviour is 
nullified by Shapiro’s study, as emerges when action is at the same time the (unpredictable, 
boundless) raising of an arm and something that can be planned beforehand.58 So we read: 
[a] plan is applied prospectively when it is used to determine which 
actions are required, permitted, or authorized in the circumstances; a 
                                                          
52 S. J. SHAPIRO, Legality, Cambridge, 2011, p. 107. 
53Ibid, p. 199. 
54 Ibid, p. 155. 
55 Ibid, p. 155 and p. 154 respectively. Emphasis added. Hence the law has a constitutive moral aim. Ibid, p. 
212. 
56 Ibid, p. 127. Emphasis added. See also ibid, p. 152. 
57 Ibid, pp. 147–48. 
58 Shapiro, supra note 52, p. 123 and p. 125. See also ibid, p. 130. Other scholarship by Shapiro could be quoted 
for our scope. This would include ibid ‘The Rationality of Rule-Guided Behavior: A Statement of the Problem’ 
(2005) 42 San Diego Law Review 55; ibid ‘Law, Plans, and Practical Reason’ (2008) 8(4) Legal Theory 387; 
ibid ‘Law, Morality and the Guidance of Conduct’ (2000) 6(2) Legal Theory 127; ibid ‘How Rules Affect 
Practical Reasoning’ in B. VERBEEK (ed.), Reasons and Intentions, Aldershot, 2008, 133–54. See also S.J. 
SHAPIRO and E. MCCLENNEN, ‘Rule-Guided Behaviour’ in P. NEWMAN (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law, New York, 1998. 
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plan is applied retrospectively when it is employed to assess whether 
an action conformed, or failed to conform, to the plan in question.59 
Behaviour has now disappeared or, we may say, is still there with the resemblances of 
calculative (or speculative) action.60 Even the most sound critiques of Shapiro’s conception 
fail to notice this. 61  Importantly, when reviewing Shapiro’s monograph, William A. 
Edmundson pointed out that the ‘beauty of plans’ lies precisely in their capacity to 
‘constrai[n] how the planner thinks and acts’.62 This is what makes ‘Planning Theory ... 
important, novel, and illuminating’ and why ‘[t]he Planning Theory of legality is original and 
illuminating’.63 It cannot go unnoticed that Edmundson paraphrases Kelsen when arguing so. 
Bearing in mind Agamben’s aforementioned archaeological account on the use that Kelsen 
had made of the Kantian ontology of operativity, we may say that Kant would certainly agree 
with Edmundson’s praise of self-annihilating planning. In this respect, if Edmundson is right 
in saying that legal theory is nothing but an exercise in political philosophy and that legal 
theorists ought to bear the responsibility to which this leads,64 we should perhaps admit that 
with both Shapiro’s and Edmundson’s words the administrative paradigm of the liberal 
technē oikonomikē65  has been provided with a normative validation and thus brought to 
completion: that is, our post-historical and post-political inhuman condition has been ‘norm-
alised’ through the ultimate endorsement of the Stoic view that nothing is without a cause, 
and thus, that only ‘appropriate’ actions are ‘virtuous’ actions (to be discussed below).  
Cicero, who aimed to push farther the Stoic ethical doctrine, called this structural worldview 
humanitas and translated the term ‘appropriate action’ as ‘duty’ or ufficium—a notion around 
                                                          
59 Shapiro, supra note 52, p. 126. 
60 Paraphrasing Agamben, we may say that Shapiro’s liberalism normalises the politico-theological ‘strategy 
that leads to conceiving human action as an officium’. See Agamben, supra note 28, 91. In this sense, to 
illustrate why action is never programmed, Shapiro’s account should be compared with Cassirer’s discussion of 
Henry Head’s immediate and mediate action. Action is never programmed, not even when is ‘anticipated in 
thought’ via a ‘symbolic element’ through which the ‘idea of a definite goal is formed’. See E. CASSIRER, The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. III, Ralph Mainhem trans., New Haven, 1929 [1957], p. 214. 
61 E.  SHERWIN, ‘Legality and Rationality: A Comment of Shapiro’s Legality’ (2013) 19(4) Legal Theory 403. 
See also A.  HATZISTAVROU, ‘Instrumental Rules and Motivation’ (2006) 12(4) Legal Theory 315. 
62 W.A. EDMUNDSON, ‘Shmegality’ (2011) 2(1) Jurisprudence 273, 274. 
63 Ibid and at 290 respectively. 
64 ‘Why Legal Theory is Political Philosophy’ (2013) 19(4) Legal Theory 331. 
65 ‘This logic’, Edmundson notes, ‘achieves an economy that spontaneity cannot’. See Edmundson, supra note 
62, p. 274.  Emphases added. 
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which Agamben developed his critique of the ontology of modernity. It is therefore not a 
coincidence that, two millennia later, Heidegger, in his fight against metaphysics, logic, and 
ontology, unfolded this notion and placed it at the centre of humankind’s animalisation as 
prompted by the behaviouralisation of its existence. 
And indeed, in Legality we read that: 
[i]n a shared activity, then, the actions of the participants must be 
coordinated with one another in order to benefit from the pooling of 
talent. The utility of any course of action cannot be evaluated in 
isolation but only as part of a total vector of concerted effort. Rational 
deliberation in a shared activity is, therefore, inherently strategic: 
what one person ought to do depends on what others will do.66 
Similarly, Edmundson writes that ‘[p]lanning’s advantages are compounded where not 
individual but joint activity is contemplated’.67 It seems, then, that the nature (and ‘beauty’) 
of our ‘act-ivities’ depends on the usefulness of our tactical ability to organise them prior to 
their taking place. In this way, planning ceases to be a mere regulating principle, and 
becomes a posited norm in metaphysical and ontological terms. Yet the flaws of this view 
emerge when we bear in mind that Hayek—who Shapiro quotes to support his argumentative 
‘plan’ without paying enough attention to his soft-decisionism68—defined this illusion as the 
fallacy of constructivist rationalism,69 and that Heidegger contended the following in the 
‘Letter on Humanism’:  
We view action only as causing an effect. The actuality of the effect is 
valued according to its utility. But the essence of action is 
                                                          
66 Shapiro, supra note 52, p. 131. It is worth noting that Hannah Arendt’s reflections on what constitutes action, 
as well as what distinguishes it from activity and behaviour, do not figure in Shapiro’s account. See Arendt, 
‘Some Questions of Moral Philosophy’, supra note 28. 
67 Edmundson, supra note 62, p.  274. 
68 Author 
69 Author 
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accomplishment. To accomplish means to unfold something into the 
fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this fullness—producere.70 
The fact that these words on the inappropriateness of combining action with convenience 
were written by a philosopher whose aim was to fight the artifice brought about by the 
metaphysical tradition of subjectivity should make us reflect. In this sense, Shapiro’s 
insistence on behavioural, planned joint activity may shed new light on why the crisis of 
decision-making processes that the West is currently experiencing is, above all, the 
existentialist crisis of what makes us human. What matters, then, is not (or not only) that (the 
idea of) justice does not appear in Shapiro’s account,71 but that his planning theory—and, 
specifically, his belief that ‘human beings are planning creatures’72—is perfectly in line with 
universalised liberalism and its notions of ‘civilised economy’ and ‘good economic 
governance’.73  
                                                          
70  Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, supra note 13, p. 217. First emphasis added. See also ibid, The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: Word, Finitude, Solitude (William McNeill and Nicholas Walker trans., 
Indianapolis, 1995 [1983], p. 243: ‘[d]riven activity is a behaving’. 
71 Sean Coyle, ‘Legality and the Liberal Order’ (2013) 76(2) Modern Law Review 401. In criticising Shapiro’s 
functional account, Coyle contends that ‘human beings are rational enough to understand that their very reason 
is everywhere led astray by their “interests”’. After having quoted Hobbes to support his claim, Coyle goes on 
and specifies that ‘[m]en stand in need of a common rule or power: the rule of law, not of their interests’, ibid, p. 
413 and p. 414 respectively. Hannah Arendt, who spotted in Hobbes’ totalising plan the spark of the libero-
imperialist bourgeois’ intrusion into the domain of the political, would not agree with this reconstruction.  
72 Shapiro, supra note 52, p. 156. 
73 Both terms relate to the belief that governments should educate consumers, as well as build or reform 
institutions and regulate economic activities, according to rational global standards determined by outsiders. See 
Author 
In this respect, the link between the homogenisation prompted by liberal thought and Shapiro’s scholarship is 
represented by three of the four ‘misrepresentations of the spirit’ described by Heidegger. I refer to the 
‘reinterpretation of spirit as intelligence’, as a ‘tool in the service of something else’, and as something that ‘can 
be consciously cultivated and planned’.  See Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, supra note 13, 51–
52. To be compared to the attempt to explain the functioning of political and social environments through the 
so-called behavioural logic of action. See J. G. MARCH, J. OLSEN, Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis of Politics (1989). 
The notion of a ‘Global Rule of Law’ which transplants at the global level the understanding of the rule of law 
as a ‘principle of governance’, rather than government, should be inquired from this perspective. See Peter 
Rijpkema, ‘The Concept of a Global Rule of Law’ (2013) 4(2) Transnational Legal Theory 167. 
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If we live in an age in which ‘popular sovereignty [is] an expression drained of all 
meaning’,74 it is also because the ‘beauty’ of planned rational and mechanical causations is 
misleadingly imposed on given forms of polity from the outside (if planning has the virtues 
Shapiro describes, why should we not make everybody see how beneficial it is?). It is 
therefore not a coincidence that in the current process of de-juridification and de-
politicisation, self-asserting forms of cultural signification are nullified by the replacement of 
value-informed legal norms (government) with value-free social rules (governance). The fact 
that we all ‘(non-)live’ in a sort of contemplative ‘global Eden’ in which we do not have 
sense of our living experience because we neither come to birth nor die as ‘someone’75 is 
nothing but the inevitable outcome.  
 
3. The Normative Structuralisation of Contemplative Behaviour 
3.1. The Fallen Condition of Language and Legal Positivism’s Structuralism  
Some commentators might argue that the normative endorsement of the ‘action to behaviour’ 
shift is not an exclusive prerogative of the legal positivist tradition, as it is present in other 
philosophical threads as well, such as that of the natural law school.76 The role that Lon L. 
Fuller assigned to ‘economic calculation’ in humans’ movement toward the ‘morality of 
aspiration’ is testament to the appropriateness of such a claim.77 The same may be said of 
how Fuller, like his positivist counterparts, interchanges the terms ‘action’ and ‘behaviour’ 
throughout his masterpiece. This is so despite both his aim to differentiate the horizontal 
working logic of legal systems from the vertical one of managerial direction and his belief 
that law does more than subjecting human conduct to rules.78  
Yet to be successful and perform its regulative instances, the behaviouralisation of man’s 
conduct had to be inscribed within an institutional framework of authoritative reference and 
legitimation. This is what, put bluntly, LP’s reason-oriented structuralism has done. In 
particular, the logic which has been discussed in previous Section and through which legal 
                                                          
74 G. AGAMBEN, ‘Introductory Note on the Concept of Democracy’, in Democracy in What State?, New York, 
2012 [2009], pp. 1–5, at 4. 
75 Author 
76 I want to thank Michael Gordon, Julian Webb, Lael Weis and George Duke for stressing this point. 
77 Leon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, New Haven, 1964, 44–46. 
78 Ibid, p. 121, p. 162, p. 205, and p. 146 respectively. 
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positivists provide action with a source to make sense of its operativity (i.e., reasons for 
action), is the same logic that has served them to create the transcendental apparatus of 
institutional recognition through which the operativity of legal norms is assessed (i.e., a legal 
norm is valid because of its source, not its merit).  
In the following pages, this dialectical process will be described by addressing Heidegger’s 
notion of ontology and theology,79 and delving into Agamben’s philosophy of language.80 
The latter will be used to explore the essence of LP’s institutional ‘utterances’—and, thus, its 
politics of writing and speech, and forms of rhetorical elaboration—in light of both the fallen 
condition of human language and redemption of contemplative Adamic language. Finally, 
careful attention will also be paid to Ernst Cassirer’s fundamental studies on language as one 
of the primordial symbolic forms with which humans mediate reality and synthesise it. 
Adam and Eve’s Fall from Eden was indeed caused by their desire for knowledge and 
communicability. 81  With the Fall, self-defining, unpredictable action took the place of 
rational, contemplative behaviour, and ‘power’ (potestas, conservatio, executio, dynamis, 
gubernatio, acting, praxis, legality, angels) emerged out of ‘authority’ (auctoritas, creatio, 
ordinatio, ousia, gloria, being, substance, legitimacy, God). 82  Building on Benjamin, 
Agamben83 contends that the formation of this dualism shares important elements with the 
Stoic philosophy of language, according to which the pure and unreachable ‘level of names’ 
is different from the human and fallible ‘level of discourse.’ A similar claim was made in 
1946 by Cassirer, according to whom Stoic philosophy underpins the (politico-theological) 
                                                          
79 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, supra note 13, p. 59. 
80 Agamben, supra note 46; ibid Means Without End. Notes on Politics (Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino 
trans., Minneapolis, 2000 [1996]; ibid supra note 2; ibid, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological 
Genealogy of Economy and Government (Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini trans, Stanford, 2011 [2007]; 
ibid The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath, Adam Kotso trans., Stanford, 2011 [2008]; ibid 
‘Introductory Note’, supra note 74. 
81 Agamben, supra note 46; E. PAGELS, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent: Sex and Politics in Early Christianity, New 
York, 1999 [1988]; Gary A. ANDERSON, The Genesis of Perfection: Adam and Eve in Jewish and Christian 
Imagination, Lousiville, 2001; Kahn, Out of Eden, supra note 17; ibid Putting Liberalism in Its Place, supra 
note 17, pp. 184–97. See also W. BENJAMIN, ‘One-Way Street’, in Selected Writings, Vol I, Marcus Bullock and 
Michael W. Jennings eds., Edmund Jephcott trans., Cambridge, MA, [1980] 1996, p. 482. 
82 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, supra note 80, p. 141, also speaks of ‘transcendence/immanence, 
general providence/special providence (or fate), first causes/second causes, eternity/temporality, intellectual 
knowledge/praxis’. 
83 G. AGAMBEN, ‘Language and History’, in Potentialities, supra note 2, pp. 48–61, at 49. 
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myth of the modern state. 84  However, Agamben did not consider that even the Stoics’ 
conception has a hidden forerunner which, with its focus on a primordial substantial cause or 
first principle, gave rise to the Western scientific tradition and influenced not only Stoic 
reasoning, but also Plato’s universalist theory of Ideas, and thus, Christianity and the whole 
Western politico-theological, liberal, and positivist thought as such. I refer to Anaximander’s 
(logical) cosmology, which Cornford not coincidentally defined as a ‘the most reasonable 
theory of the origin and structure of the world’ of that time and whose canon is ‘a power 
which ordains both what must be and ought to be’.85 
For our purposes, this is important for two reasons. The first is because, by isolating and 
displacing authority from view,86 the Western politico-theological tradition has nullified the 
political source (and essence) of power and rendered its exercise a mere administrative task. 
This is how government has become governance. The second reason is because, in terms of 
juris genesis,87 LP’s ground-giving, systematic order of institutional reference has reproduced 
and validated this schism. For politics to assume, in Agamben’s words, ‘the form of an 
oikonomia, that is, of a governance of empty speech over bare life,’88 LP’s metaphysical and 
ontological rationalism had to enter the scene and provide a normative and institutional 
validation for liberalism’s agenda. 
                                                          
84 E. CASSIRER, The Myth of the State, New Haven, 1974 [1946], pp. 163–75. See also Robert W. Sharples, 
‘Philosophy for Life’, in G.R. BUGH (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, Cambridge, 
[2006] 2011, pp. 223–40, at 233, according to whom the Stoics’ belief that ‘[n]othing happens without a cause . 
. . is a theological assertion of the power of divine providence’. Hence, to the Stoics, ‘[h]uman actions are 
predetermined as everything else’, ibid. 
85 F.M. CORNFORD, From Religion to Philosophy. A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation, Dover, 2004 
[1912], p. 11. First emphasis added. In Cornford’s words, Anaximander’s cosmology is composed of ‘three 
main factors or representations: (1) a primary stuff (physis); (2) an order, disposition, or structure into which this 
stuff is distributed; (3) the process by which this order arose’, ibid, p. 9. See also ibid, pp. 144–47. Finally, see 
Cassirer, supra note 84, p. 54. 
86  Hannah Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’, in Between Past and Future, London, 2006 [1961], pp. 91–141; 
Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, supra note 80; ibid ‘Introductory Note’, supra note 74. See also Ernst H. 
Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, Princeton, 1981 [1957]. 
87 My use of the genealogical method is different from that of Sylvie Delacroix in that mine looks for the 
metaphysical origin of the process it inquiries into. See Sylvie Delacroix, Legal Norms and Normativity: An 
Essay in Genealogy, London, 2006. Critically, see Maksymilian Del Mar, ‘Legal Norms and Normativity’ 
(2007) 27(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 355. 
88 Agamben, The Sacrament of Language, supra note 80, p. 72. Second and third emphases added. 
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3.2. The Structural Artifice 
The anthropological illusion at the centre of this paper is truly ontological in its signifying 
and pervasive structure. That is, it has used ontology’s logic to promote itself.  With this I 
refer not only to ontology as the science that investigates what ‘exists’, 89  but also to 
Heidegger’s definition of ontology as that branch of concept-oriented, metaphysical thinking 
that looks for the universal and common ground of beings.90 Thus, from an ontological point 
of view, the substitution of action with behaviour would have not been possible without the 
back-up of a legitimatising apparatus of reference. The theological component of the Western 
tradition that LP has inherited has filled this post-political role. Not coincidentally, Heidegger 
was of the opinion that ontology and theology are united in their metaphysical logic. In his 
words,  
Ontology ... and theology ... account for Being as the ground of 
beings. They account to the Λόγος, and are in an essential sense in 
accord with the Λόγος-, that is they are the logic of the Λόγος.91 
Building on these insights, Agamben has spent a great amount of effort to demonstrate that, 
since the Greek polis, Western politics has been characterised by the two paradigms of 
‘politico-juridical’ and ‘economic-governmental’ rationality. In doing so, Agamben has 
moved on from his teacher and proved that by transposing the Pauline concept of the 
                                                          
89 On legal ontology, see Author 
90 Heidegger, ‘Identity and Difference’, supra note 13, p. 58. See also ibid The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic (Michael Heim trans., Indiana University Press 1984 [1978]); ibid ‘What is Metaphysics?’, in Basic 
Writings, supra note 13, pp. 93–110, at 106. On why metaphysics ‘thinks of man on the basis of animalitas’, see 
ibid ‘Letter on Humanism’, supra note 13, pp. 226–27. See also ibid ‘The Thing’, supra note 13, p. 176; ibid 
‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, in Basic Writings, supra note 13, 432; ibid The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics, supra note 70; ibid Parmenides, supra note 13, pp. 49–54. See also A. KOJÉVE, The 
Notion of Authority (A Brief Presentation), François Terré ed., Hager Weslati trans., New York, 2014 [2004], p. 
57. 
91 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, supra note 13, p. 59. See also ibid Introduction to Metaphysics, supra note 
13, p. 45 and pp. 132–34; ibid Being and Time (John Macquarie and Edward Robinson trans., New York, 2008 
[1927], pp. 55–58. See also J. DERRIDA, Heidegger, la question de l’Être et l’Histoire, Cours de l’ENS-Ulm 
1064-1965, Linné, 2013, p. 23. 
Heidegger’s insights may also assist us in understanding why Hannah Arendt was of the idea that, by being 
based on the principle of non-contradiction, Kant’s ‘secular morality’ is logical. See Arendt, ‘Some Questions of 
Moral Philosophy’, supra note 28, p. 123. 
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‘economy of the mystery’ into the ‘mystery of the economy’, the Church has made the 
(theological) ‘economic-managerial’ paradigm the key component of Western civilisation. 
More precisely, drawing from Kafka and Benjamin while describing how our inhuman 
condition is a product of the West’s ‘double governmental machine’, Agamben condemned 
the angels (and, thus, the regulatory apparatus rooted in the Church’s paradigm) for having 
failed their mission and argued that only Paul’s original Messiah can save humankind. 
Agamben’s aim is to demonstrate that the modern state has ‘inherited’ the same logic of the 
Trinitarian paradigm of the oikonomia as ‘activity of management and government of people 
and things’.92 While it was with Rousseau that the ‘machine of providence [was] transferred 
from the theological to the political sphere’, 93  it was only with liberalism that this 
phenomenon was fully embraced and pushed farther.94 Thus, taking the side of Peterson 
contra Schmitt to delve into the subjectless essence of this strategy,95 of which the kénōsis is 
                                                          
92 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, supra note 80, p. 278. See also ibid, p. 142 and pp. 261–87; ibid The 
Time that Remains. A Comment to the Letter to the Romans, Patricia Daily trans., Stanford, 2005 [2000]; ibid 
supra note 16, p. 81; ibid ‘Introductory Note’, supra note 74, p. 4; ibid, Opus Dei, supra note 28. See also J. 
DERRIDA, Rogues. Two Essays on Reason, Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas trans. Stanford, 2005 [2003], 
p. 28. 
93 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, supra note 80, p. 272. 
94 Ibid, pp. 284–85. See also ibid Stasis. Civil war as a Political Paradigm, Nicholas Heron trans., Stanford, 
2015 [2015], pp. 22–24. 
95 ‘[T]he liturgical praxis of the Church [is defined by] the independence of the objective effectiveness and 
validity of the sacrament from the subject who concretely administers it’. That is, ‘the agent acts only insofar as 
it is an effect in its turn’ so that ‘action [is] reduced to [an] instrumental cause’. See Agamben, Opus Dei, supra 
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Socrates, Plato taught us, drank the cup of hemlock calmly because he believed in the immortality of the soul. 
The influence of this transcendental view on Plato’s belief that, in Heidegger’s words, ‘what endures . . . is what 
remains permanently’, as well as on the Aristotelian doctrine of the ‘eternity of the world’, is evident: to 
preserve the ‘corpo-rational’ perpetuity of the ‘body’, the singular units which compose it have to be 
replaceable. Or, we may say, ‘being’ has to be emptied in favour of (never ending) ‘becoming’ so that historical 
beings may be compatible with their ideal prototype. Agamben showed that this philosophical conception was 
first inherited by Christianity and then absorbed by liberal thought for regulative purposes. In particular, while 
the former transformed it into a biopolitical and regulative dogma, the latter extended it to society at large. And 
indeed, Agamben notes, the Greek term paroikousa ‘designates the manner in which foreigners and those in 
exile dwell’. Furthermore, paroikein ‘to sojourn as a foreigner . . . is the word that designates how a Christian is 
to live in the world’. Hence, the reason why in liberal thought identities are innocent and humans are 
interchangeable contracting units is that, in the corpus Christi of the Church, humans are but foreigners 
deprived of what defines them.  
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the political paradigm par excellence,96 Agamben contends that modernity has done nothing 
other than to show that the subjects of biopolitics are treated as ‘animals’ and no one can be 
held responsible for it.97  
Legal positivists, I believe, stand among Agamben’s angels. That is, as militia legum, they 
represent a zone of indistinction between the militia coelestis of the clergy and Baldus’s 
militia doctoralis. Paraphrasing the cabalist episode of the Shekinah—the isolation, made by 
the Rabbi Aher after having entered into Pardes, of the ‘word’ as ‘the last of the ten Sefirot or 
attributes of the divinity’98—it may be said that, far from acting as a mere descriptive theory, 
LP has normalised both the separation of power from authority and the inclusion of the latter 
in it. From Bentham to Austin, passing through Hobbes, Kelsen, and Hart, to contemporary 
positivists such Marmor, Shapiro, Raz, Green, Kramer, and others, the working logic of LP’s 
performative dualistic apparatus of primary and secondary causes has essentially reproduced 
the politico-theological dichotomy between authority and power, by existentially turning 
action against itself so that it could be transformed into behaviour.  
If, as Arendt noted, ‘authority has vanished from the modern world’,99 it is because what 
modernity has witnessed is nothing but the experience of the folding up of action’s hyperbole 
prompted by the politico-theological and liberal self-emptying paradigm and further endorsed 
by LP’s dual characterisation. To say it differently, if we live in the post-historical and post-
political age, it is because the substitution of action with behaviour has determined the 
absorption of authority by power. The effect of this operation—apolitical in its form, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See M. HEIDEGGER, ‘On the Essence of Ground’, in Pathmarks, William McNeill ed., Cambridge, 1998 [1967], 
pp. 97–135; ibid ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in The Question Concerning Technology, supra note 
13, p. 30; ibid Introduction to Metaphysics, supra note 12, 102–230; ibid, Parmenides, supra note 13, p. 93; 
Kantorowicz, supra note 86, pp. 273–92; G. AGAMBEN, The Church and the Kingdom, Leland de la Durantaye 
trans., London, 2012 [2010], pp. 1–2. 
96 See Moltmann’s contention that ‘in Christian life . . . the question of identity comes to a head only in the 
context of non-identity, self-emptying for the sake of others and solidarity of others’, in The Crucified God, 
New York, 2001 [1974], p. 12. See also ibid, pp. 13–23. 
97 G. AGAMBEN, Homo Sacer. Sovereignty and Bare Life (Daniel-Heller Roazen trans., Stanford, 1998 [1995], 
6.  
98 Agamben, The Coming Community, supra note 46, p. 81. See also ibid ‘Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality’, 
in Potentialities, supra note 2, pp. 205–19. 
99 Arendt, supra note 86, p. 91. See also ibid On Revolution, London, 2006 [1963], pp. 171–206. 
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political in its consequences—is manifesting itself in our neorealist global age in the terms 
described in the introductory part of this article. 
Paraphrasing Cassirer, LP’s structure ought to be judged the function it has had, and still has, 
in this dehumanising process.100 In particular, the very act of positing the law and legitimising 
this authoritarian operation through reference to a real, concrete and yet sublime and 
unreachable meta-source of validation is what we should delve into if we are to uncover the 
true essence of LP’s artifice. It is of little significance whether the necessary connection that 
informs the ‘primary/secondary’ causes antithesis assumes the form of a constituent 
sovereign as opposed to a constituted official (Hobbes and Austin), or a general will as 
opposed to particular wills (Rousseau), or a Grundnorm as opposed to an ordinary norm 
(Kelsen), or a social convention/rule of recognition as opposed to a rule of obligation (Hart 
and adherents). What matters is that while, according to classic story-telling narratives, legal 
positivists were looking for legitimacy and validity by promoting a legal understanding of 
societal relations that guarantees civil liberties, the transcendental apparatus of institutional 
recognition and validation that they used (i.e., the idea that all legal norms can be traced back 
to a source of reference) is truly metaphysical101 and has served to return us to the ‘global 
Eden’ by passivizing our existence.102  
                                                          
100 E. CASSIRER, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. I., Ralph Manheim trans., New Haven, 1955 [1923], 
p. 79. 
101 I use the term ‘metaphysical’ in a Heideggerian fashion: ‘[t]he essential constitution of metaphysics is based 
on the unity of beings as such in the universal and that which is the highest’. See Heidegger, Identity and 
Difference, supra note 13, p. 61. See also ibid. p. 58 and p. 71. 
Others, such as Tobin Spaak, have indirectly pointed at LP’s metaphysical essence by focusing on its aim to 
offer an account of the concept of law. As such, LP is defined as a ‘meta-theory of law’. See T. SPAAK, A 
Critical Appraisal of Karl Olivecrona’s Legal Philosophy, Dordrecht, 2014, p. 245. 
102 The language used by Hart in his practice theory offers an astounding example of this: the rules which 
legitimate the existence and enforcement of rules of conduct are secondary, that is, they are placed on an outer 
level of appearance, even though they exercise a primary function. It would be worthwhile to analyse Hart’s 
conception through the lens of Heidegger’s account on the ‘usual concept of truth’. According to Heidegger, in 
the West, under the influence of the ‘Christian theological belief’, logical truth has always implied the 
preconceived correspondence between knowledge and matter. In his words, 
 
[t]he theologically conceived order of creation is replaced by the capacity of all 
objects to be planned by means of a worldly reason … which supplies the law for 
itself and thus also claims that its procedure is immediately intelligible. 
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The substitution of action with behaviour becomes in this sense even more understandable, as 
action is the manifestation of the sovereign decision that creates, as God did, something from 
nothingness.103 Thus, neither metaphysics nor science, with their shared focus on the cause 
and ‘beingness’ of phenomena, may access the essence of action (ex nihilo nihil fit),104 and 
law as understood by legal positivists, that is as ethereal, abstract, and general scientia juris, 
can never understand it fully. Consequently, the only form of conduct that may have a 
legitimising source, or a causa materialis, in ontological and normative terms is behaviour. 
This is why, as set out in the previous Section, legal positivists make of the reasons for action 
(practical reason) the canon of their arguments—as a way to make sense ontologically and 
normativistically of something that cannot, by anthropological and philosophical definition, 
be explained in rational terms.105 The influence of Herbert A. Simon’s studies on the link 
between the rational essence of modernity and the use that the rational actor makes of the law 
to pursue his/her own interests when evaluating behavioural alternatives, or the role that 
Georg Henrik von Wright’s scholarship on the logic of action has played in recent 
scholarship on Hart’s internal acceptance of social rules, are clear testament to this.106 Thus, 
the transformation of the ‘action to behaviour’ philosophical and anthropological shift into a 
normative conception would have not been possible without LP’s structural objectification of 
law’s character, and the fulfilment, through it, of the Western politico-theological managerial 
paradigm. Put differently, positivist thought has transformed the liberal illusion into a 
juridical artifice that has acted, through a double-featured structure of bio-power, as a macro 
‘social sedative’ without which the consolidation of our post-historical and post-political 
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Metaphysics, supra note 13, pp. 28–29. See also below note 154. 
105 Cf. the role assigned by Peter Stein to Aristotle’s notion of science in the development of Western legal 
thinking, in Regulae Iuris. From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims, Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 33–36. 
Even those who try to overcome the limits legal rationalists’ thought cannot avoid grounding action in a rational 
base. See C. ESSERT, ‘Legal Obligations and Reason’ (2013) 19(1) Legal Theory 63. For a sociological view, 
see A GIDDENS, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Cambridge, 1984. 
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condition would have not occurred. If this is correct, David Dyzenhaus’s insights into ‘why 
legal positivism is authoritarian’ 107  as well as his association of LP’s philosophy with 
undesirable consequences in real-life politics can be evaluated from a different, and more 
comprehensive, standpoint.108 
To Agamben the situation is so compromised that we may only be saved by the formation of 
a Messianic community composed of ‘singularities’ without ‘identities’ which are freed from 
all presuppositions and merely united in their ethical mannerism, that is in ‘belonging’ and 
‘appearing’ as ‘being-such(-in-language)’. 109  To neutralise the current age’s ‘complete 
confusion’ between ‘juridification and commodification of human relations’,110  Agamben 
argues, we must use our biopolitical animalisation for our own benefit by bringing it to its 
unthinkable limits. This is why Agamben writes that the fact that ‘the planetary petty 
bourgeoisie is probably the form in which humanity is moving towards its own destruction ... 
represents an opportunity unheard of in the history of humanity that it must at all costs not let 
slip away’.111 The paradigm that the Western politico-theological tradition has used to render 
us what we are—biopolitical sacrifice—can only be deactivated by our ethical profanation of 
the factical experience of language as language:  
Only those who succeed in carrying [contemporary politics’ 
experimentum linguae] to completion ... will be the first citizens of a 
community with neither presumptions nor a State, where the 
nullifying and determining power of what is common will be pacified 
....112  
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111 Agamben, The Coming Community, supra note 46, p. 65. 
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Importantly, in conceiving Pauline Messianism ‘as a corrective to the demonic hypertrophy 
of angelic and human powers’,113 Agamben contends that ‘the Messiah will only come when 
he is no longer necessary’, that is when the katargēsis will become operative. For this to 
happen, an absolute—that is, exceptional and sovereign—act of simultaneous ‘potentiality’ 
and ‘actuality’ (a destituent potential, as he defines it) is required. Agamben thus goes back 
to Plato and Aristotle and sets his political agenda apart from that of Heidegger.114 However, 
while Agamben’s reconstruction of the origins of the ‘capitalist religion’115 that underpins our 
‘form-of-(non-)living’ is surely convincing, the urgent need to defeat the nihilism that 
characterises our inhuman condition requires a less utopic solution. In particular, any 
concrete measure against the neutralising and inegalitarian impact of the liberal 
Westernisation of living standards will require us, as lawyers, to uncover the disruptive force 
that lies beneath LP’s humanitarian façade. 
For this to be done, our attention should also be directed toward all those accounts of law’s 
moral normativity that are said to be other than positivist but that, in fact, reproduce LP’s 
illusion as I have described it. I primarily refer to Stefano Bertea’s account of law’s 
normative claim.116 In his well-known and thought-provoking monograph, Bertea declares 
that his non-positivist 117  vision of law’s normativity is pragmatically Kantian, ‘action-
centred’, and yet non-metaphysical. 118  The same understanding was put forward more 
recently in an essay whose intent was to demonstrate that ‘the normativity of practical reason 
... ultimately lies in an agent’s responsiveness to reason’.119 In particular, Bertea’s aim is to 
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oppose inclusive positivism120 on three grounds. For our purposes, I will consider only the 
third component of Bertea’s critique, namely that 
to delimit the scope of the normative claim of law, to the effect that it 
is seen as a claim made only on those committed to a legal system, is 
at the origin of both a defective understanding of the legal enterprise 
and a mistaken picture of the relations obtaining between officials and 
citizens.121 
This limited view, Bertea further maintains, falls short in explaining how (and why) a legal 
system works through law’s normative claim. More precisely, in addressing Coleman’s 
inclusive positivism and its notion that ‘the normative concerns of the law are addressed 
exclusively to legal officials’, 122  Bertea argues that ‘the law is capable of serving the 
objectives in the pursuit of which legal officials commit themselves to the legal system only 
if citizens at large treat the standards issued by the officials as reasons for action and so 
conform to them’.123 Although Bertea’s attempt to detach law from metaphysic is all the 
more essential in light of what I have set out thus far, his reference to the (practical) reasons 
for action124 compromises the whole enterprise. 
Furthermore, as Alexy has recently pointed out, an important limit in Bertea’s theory is that 
combining action and shared morality does not provide decision with a ‘systematically 
relevant place’.125  Yet, in offering an account according to which ‘metaphysics and decision 
... are necessary constituents of an adequate conception of normativity’,126 Alexy’s critique 
cannot help us uncover the real essence of Bertea’s approach to law’s normativity, as it 
reproduces its same structural premises, simply in a different form. Rather, it would be more 
fruitful to evaluate Bertea’s reasoning through a neorealist lens with the use that Agamben 
has made of Peterson’s 1935 scholarship when illustrating the managerial paradigm that 
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underpins the Western tradition.127 In doing so, it will become apparent that Bertea’s moral 
desire to extend law’s normative claim from the ‘shared cooperative activity on which legal 
officials embark’128 to ordinary citizens by grounding their actions in the instances prompted 
by practical reason129 leads to the transposition into the legal dimension of humankind’s 
‘participation in the angels’.130 In other words, what we are standing in front of here is a neo-
Kantian ontology of ethical behaviour that tends to a self-nullifying ‘universal peace’ whose 
rational canon—the categorical imperative, here presented in the form of ‘human agency 
[that] rests on a purely practical anchorage’ 131—resembles the contemplatively inactive, 
norm-oriented celestial worship of the citizens-angels.132 
At this stage, it could be argued that what this paper claims is misleading, as its premise is 
flawed. Two points could be made. First, it could be suggested that normativity presupposes, 
among other things, both ontology and metaphysics. Secondly, it could be objected that the 
type of structuralism that this paper has targeted is not a prerogative of LP because, by 
definition, it features in all types of positivism. To the first objection I would respond by 
referring to what I shall contend in the conclusion of this paper, namely that normativity 
presupposes the exact opposite of what the Western metaphysical and ontological tradition 
has always shown us: authority’s negativity. The second observation would, however, surely 
be correct. Cassirer demonstrated this well when inquiring into the anthropological essence of 
language as one of the primordial symbolic forms of myth.133 I have discussed the relevance 
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[i]f the politicality and truth of the ekklēsia is defined by its participation in the 
angels, then men can also reach their full celestial citizenship only by imitation the 
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of Cassirer’s scholarship to law and legal reasoning elsewhere.134 Suffice it to say that what 
distinguishes all forms of positivism (i.e., physical, mathematical, biological, historical, etc.) 
from their legal counterpart is the latter’s biopolitical regulative force. This is why LP’s 
illusory dual structure could not have been brought to completion without the inclusion of a 
component that could act as a universalist source of inner coherence from which all 
subsequent regulative claims could be derived: justice. 
In fact, Cassirer’s description of the movement from the linguistic positivistic schools of the 
nineteenth century—according to which ‘phonetics and semantic required separate study 
according to different methods’135—to modern structuralism’s belief that ‘[t]he distinction 
between form and matter proves artificial and inadequate’136 may assist us when addressing 
the ‘occult’ side of LP’s political artifice. As happened with the transition in linguistic 
thought, the interconnected dualism of ‘authority/power’ was neutralised when, in isolating 
power from authority, legal positivists included the latter in the former, thus causing it to 
disappear. What Arendt had witnessed and reported in her reflections—the vanishing of 
authority from the world—took place precisely because LP’s metaphysical dualism has 
normalised the absorption of authority by power. The aforementioned hidden secularisation 
of naked or bare life (zoē) and political or public existence (bios) ought to be inscribed within 
this phenomenon. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Not long ago, Raz famously asked whether ‘there can be a theory of law’.137 This question is 
relevant, as the point of departure for theory is experience. 138  Indeed, by being always 
preceded by practice, theory risks being confined to a secondary role. Raz answered his own 
question by pointing out that ‘a theory of law is successful if it meets two criteria: first, it 
                                                          
134 Author 
135 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, supra note 132, p. 125. 
136 Ibid. 
137  J. RAZ, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 17–46. 
138 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, sect. 12, 
William Wallace trans., Oxford, 1975 [1830]. 
31 
 
consists of propositions about the law which are necessarily true, and, second, they explain 
what the law is’.139 
Bearing in mind what Cassirer had clarified on the ‘perils’ of language,140 the answer to 
Raz’s question that I would propose is far more straightforward: ‘Yes, there can be a theory 
of law as long as we understand and respect words’ performative force’. Words matter not 
only because the structure of language determines that of thought and culture,141 but because 
in their metaphysical and ontological negativity lies what Agamben has defined as the 
Voice142—language itself. If Agamben is right when he contends that in our age ‘humans are 
separated by what unites them [because] in the society of spectacle [the communicative 
essence of humans] ... is separated in an autonomous sphere’,143 it is because we no longer 
experience language for what it is. Instead of dwelling in it, we displace it by abusing our 
voice, thus draining it of its real essence.144 Similarly, we no longer experience authority for 
what it is, as through the ‘pathology of the legal word’ that this paper has addressed, LP’s 
rationalism has determined its separation from, and further absorption by, power.145 
So the question arises: How can (legal) language’s suffering be cured? The appropriateness 
of the answer depends on our willingness and ability to provide a solution to it, which in turn 
depend on our understanding of the phenomenon described by this paper. Hence the first step 
would be internalising why we are returning to the metaphysical seed of the Western bio-
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political and theological tradition—that is, to λόγος as contemplative logic that exerts its 
performative claims through the post-political, self-annihilating strategy prompted by 
universalised liberalism. It is usually maintained that ‘[r]eason is not man’s primitive 
endowment, but his achievement’146—a view that the positivist Comte would agree with as, 
in 1844, he described how the modern mind brought reason to its most mature phase of 
development. If anything, this demonstrates that the de-politicisation and de-juridification of 
the world we are witnessing is but the last stage of circular movement from humans’ 
behavioural contemplation of God in Eden, to active appropriation of language as primordial 
and symbolic form through which the human spirit experiences conscious freedom of 
subjectivity in Cassirerian terms, and return again to (global) Eden.  
If this is correct (or at least plausible), our animalisation cannot be defeated through the 
communalisation of the Trinitarian paradigm of ‘ontological peace, which loves all 
individuals in the community’.147 Those who propose to pursue such a roadmap with the aim 
to deactivate the violent and inhuman ‘secular nature’ of liberalism and positivism are, in 
fact, leading the Western model of behavioural self-annihilation to completion. Rather, we 
should focus on Heidegger’s intention to reach a thinking that thinks148 by ‘reflect[ing] on 
language qua language’,149 that, is by ‘free[ing] ourselves from the technical interpretation of 
thinking’150 promoted by the Western ‘onto-theo-logical’151 metaphysical tradition. Indeed, 
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since Heidegger’s call for a non-metaphysical ‘ek-sistence [of] the humanity of homo 
humanus’,152 the need for a revolutionary, non-ontological ethics has been urged by many, all 
in different ways. Levinas, Deleuze and Guattari, Günzel, and Bunch stand among them. 
Justice, it is usually contended, cannot truly be justice if it is inscribed within humanism’s 
exclusions. The discourse on what lies behind the ontological signification of sovereignty or, 
we may say, on what sovereignty actually is before we ‘posit-ively’ represent it153 ought to be 
analysed from this perspective and from what many now see as the exigency of a totally new 
bio-power theory. Yet as ‘nothing’ and action are equally inaccessible to scientific thought,154 
any neorealist political measure should leave the terrain of scientific inquiry and move onto 
that of pure, active experience. 
As discussed, Agamben has instead proposed to use our animalisation instrumentally against 
itself so that humankind may be freed from itself once and for all. The limit of this solution, 
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however, is that its key features are purely metaphysical.155 In this sense, although the claim 
that anarchy ‘is the very condition for doing politics in an ethical way’ 156  may sound 
fascinating, it seems to me that the challenges brought about by the need for a post-humanist 
and yet political ethics cannot be met without a juridical roadmap capable of promoting 
coherence and certainty while also rediscovering what makes us special in our simultaneous 
uniqueness and plurality in Arendtian terms. In other words, instead of opting for an 
anarchical agenda and pushing it to utopic limits, the first step along our awakening should 
take the form of a neorealist critique of the ‘form-of-(non-)life’ prompted by the 
metaphysical and ontological order of systematic totality as endorsed by the liberal world-
view and further ‘norm-alised’ by legal positivists. 
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